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“It was probably that guy?”
– The functions of reconstructive 






Th is paper explores the pragmatic and interactional functions of reconstructive 
speech acts in mock police interviews, based on a model of argumentative 
dialogue. Th e aim of the paper is to illustrate how the reconstructions 
apparently contribute to both the interaction between the police offi  cer and 
the mock suspect in the interview activity and to the interaction in the training 
activity, i.e. between the participants attending the training course. Drawing 
on functional pragmatics and grammar, the analysis seeks to examine how 
reconstructions on the one hand function in the socially non-cooperative 
interaction in the mock interview, questioning the truth value of propositions 
and trustworthiness of the suspect, and, on the other hand seem to fulfi l a 
supportive purpose in the training activity.
Keywords: Investigative interviewing, training activities, reconstructive 
speech acts, pragmatics, semantics, questions, forensic linguistics
1. Introduction
Taking its point of departure in speech act theory and functional grammar, 
this study focuses on reconstructive speech acts’ (see section 3) questioning 
and evaluating functions across diff erent activity types embedded in simulated 
police interviews. 
 Police interviews with witnesses and suspects are one of the main sources 
for information during criminal investigation. In Denmark, such investigative 
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interviewing is inspired by the British PEACE-model1 and principles from 
cognitive interviewing (Fischer and Geiselman 2010) and follows four stages: 
Preparation, free account, questioning and closure (Bitsch and Modin 2016:82, 
Gibbons 2003:145-146). Th e excerpts in this paper are from the stage of 
questioning, in which the interviewer “in the following order (…) will tend 
to use a lower question type if a higher one does not work (a) open questions 
(b) either/Or multiple choice questions (c) Specifi c but not leading questions 
(d) leading questions” (Gibbons 2003:145-146). Th e aim of the investigative 
interview is to clarify the circumstances of the event under investigation 
and as objectively and accurately as possible, elicit “correct information in 
an unbiased and open-minded manner compared to a question-answer 
approach” (Hviid 2017:30). 
 Since 2005, the Danish police has conducted investigative interviews 
based on the Danish interview model. Furthermore, interview training is a 
substantial part of the education and ongoing training of police offi  cers. Part 
of the training is conducted as simulated investigative interviews with police 
offi  cers playing the roles of witnesses, suspects, and interviewer. How the 
participants of such training interviews handle the shift ing communicative 
roles, and how they make sense of the contributions to this complex kind 
of interaction, has not yet been studied in a Danish context. Similar aspects 
of this kind of complex communication have been the focus of other 
studies, though, among others Linell and Th unqvist’s study of simulated 
job interviews. Linell and Th unqvist (2003:413) describe how participants 
involved in communication that involves teaching are oft en “inquiring about 
what is going on, and rehearsing, evaluating, and making meta-comments on 
activities and happenings”. Th us, Linell and Th unqvist (2003:431) notes, the 
participants move in and out of framings2 and “build their utterances to fi t a 
specifi c activity context, or to fi t several such contexts at the same time, and 
they enact role identities associated with these activities”. 
 In the data of the present study, the participants also seem to orient to 
diff erent framings and the activity types (Levinson 1992) embedded in the 
interview training-situation. Most of the time, though, evaluation and meta-
comments are phrased as utterances that can count as contributions to both 
the training activity and the interview activity. Th e excerpts presented in 
this paper are illustrative of how interlocutors in complex communicative 
activities, with distinctly diff erent inferential frames to derive inference from, 
manage to navigate and switch between activities. Reconstructive speech acts 
seem to be a helpful tool for this. Th us, the analysis serves to illustrate how 
diff erent activity types make certain inferences possible and acceptable, and 
to demonstrate how a model of argumentative dialogue holds useful concepts 
for analysing the negotiation of meaning across activities. 
 In authentic as well as mock investigative interviews, the reconstructive 
speech acts seem to serve the purpose of open questions well as they invite 
the interviewee to provide a more or less free account. However, a police 
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interview is an activity type where “police offi  cers tend to use questions to 
glean information, query, accuse, etc., with the ultimate aim of testing the 
veracity of a witness’s or suspect’s account of events (Archer 2020, this issue, 
see also Vrij 2008). Th at is, an activity type with a built-in confl ict or divergent 
points of view. On that basis, Nielsen’s model of argumentative dialogue (Nielsen 
2005) establishes a useful starting point for the analysis of the interaction in 
training interviews, in particular the notions of reconstruction and criticism. 
Among others, Nielsen’s model draws on Searle’s (1976) speech act theory and 
Grice’s (1975) cooperative principle that, accordingly, form the theoretical 
and analytical framework of the present study. In addition, the analysis of 
the contextual pragmatic functions of the reconstructions draws on Danish 
Functional Grammar (Hansen and Heltoft  2019) and studies of epistemic 
stance in Danish spoken language (Mortensen 2012) and in courtroom 
interaction (Mortensen and Mortensen 2017). 
 An evaluating function of reconstructions is the focus of this paper, that 
is, reconstructions that function as questions while at the same time evaluate 
certain aspects of the interviewee’s3 utterances – apparently across the activities 
embedded in the training interview. My labelling of the reconstructions 
as questions is based on semantic and contextual interpretations (see also 
section 4.1), but since the aim of this paper is not to determine whether the 
reconstructions are to be considered questions or not, I will refrain from 
discussing ways to identify and classify questions.
2. Th e training interview activity 
Th e interaction analysed in this study takes place as a mock police interview 
during a training course for police offi  cers. Th us, there are, at least, two diff erent 
activity types (Levinson 1992), the interview activity and the training activity, 
embedded in the overarching and complex activity, the training interview. 
 Th e participants in the training interview probably know each other, 
at least from attending the same training course for some days. Within the 
context of the training activity, the relation is symmetric, and the goals for 
the participants are probably more or less the same; that is, training and 
improving their interviewing skills and performing well in order to make the 
mock interview proceed the best way possible. Consequently, the participants 
have a common interest in keeping the mock interview on the right track and 
play their roles as they are instructed to do. 
 In the context of the interview activity, the interviewees follow their 
instructions about what they are supposed to tell the interviewer – and what 
they do not want to tell. Th e participants try to simulate an asymmetric 
relation, but obviously, the conditions for the interaction in the interview 
activity are not the same as the conditions for an authentic police interview, 
neither regarding the relation between the participants or possible confl icting 
goals and interests. 
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 As already mentioned, the training interview holds two diff erent activity 
types. On the one hand, these activities constitute diff erent framings for the 
interlocutors to act within, and on the other hand, they intertwine. Activity 
types are ”a fuzzy category whose focal members are goal-defi ned, socially 
constituted, bounded, events with constraints on participants, setting, and so 
on, but above all on the kinds of allowable contributions” (Levinson 1992:69). 
Hence, the notion of activity types is a useful tool for distinguishing and 
analysing the interaction and the interlocutors’ speech acts in the training 
interview.
 Activities hold distinctive structural elements that are ”rationally and 
functionally adapted to the point or goal of the activity in question, that is the 
function or functions that members of the society see the activity as having” 
(Levinson 1992:71). Th us, the activity type constrains which roles it is possible 
for the interlocutors to have, and how they are able to contribute to the 
interaction, linguistically as well. Speech can be a more or less integrated part 
of an activity, and the organisation of the activity both constrains “what will 
count as an allowable contribution to each activity”, and constitutes certain 
activity-specifi c rules of inference that “help to determine how what one says will 
be ”taken” – that is, what kinds of inferences will be made from what is said” 
(Levinson 1992:97). As regards rules of inference, the training activity and the 
interview activity constitute quite diff erent framings for the participants to 
derive meaning from. In addition, the interview activity simulates a relation 
between participants with assumed confl icting goals and assumed lack of 
social cooperation4 (Archer 2005:58). Even so, Levinson (1992:77) notes, 
”there could be some quite interesting relations between Grice’s maxims and 
diff erent kinds of activities, of a sort where some of the maxims are selectively 
relaxed to varying degrees in activities of specifi c types”. Levinson (1992:78) 
argues that even in conversations that are not inherently cooperative, i.e. in 
the social sense of the word, it is possible to talk about relations between 
specifi c activity types and Grice’s maxims, if one ”accept[s] Grice’s maxims 
as specifi cations of some basic unmarked communication context, deviations 
from which, however common, are seen as special or marked”. 
3. Th eoretical background
Th e notion of reconstruction employed in this study, is inspired by the model 
of argumentative dialogue put forward by Nielsen (2005, 2010), in which 
the counter argumentative speech act types reconstruction and criticism are 
discussed in detail. Th e model is rooted in the pragma-dialectical school 
of argumentation studies (e.g. van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, Grootendorst et al. 1996, Nielsen 2005) 
that combines “the pragmatic focus on language as social action with the 
dialectical focus of rule-based confl ict resolution” (Nielsen 2005:26). In the 
pragma-dialectical approach, arguments are identifi ed as external, functional, 
social and dialectical. Consequently, studying argumentation builds on four 
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corresponding methodological premises that “are the basis for integrating 
the descriptive dimension of argumentation as an actual phenomenon of 
argumentative discourse with the normative dimension of argumentation as 
an essential ingredient of critical discussion” (Grootendorst et al. 1996:276). 
Briefl y outlined, the methodological premise of functionalisation points to 
the focus on “the function of argumentation in the verbal management of 
disagreement” (Grootendorst et al. 1996:278) and as persuasive acts (Nielsen 
2005:27). Th e notion of externalisation covers the focus on language and what 
interlocutors “have expressed in discourse, whether directly or indirectly” 
(Grootendorst et al. 1996:276). Considering arguments as communicative and 
interactional acts, psychological dispositions and motives should not be the 
focus of analysis. Rather, the analysis of arguments is supposed to concentrate 
on the “externalized-or externalizable-commitments” of the interlocutors 
(Grootendorst et al. 1996:277) and “distinguish what commitments follow 
from the discursive contributions” (Nielsen 2005:27).
 Identifying arguments as social, signals that argumentation is a dialogical 
process involving two or more interlocutors participating in argumentative 
interaction, “switching the communicative roles of speaker and hearer, and the 
interactional roles of protagonist and antagonist” (Nielsen 2005:27). Finally, 
according to Nielsen (2005:28) “dialectifi cation of argumentation refers to van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst’s philosophical position in critical rationalism” 
and the idea that argumentation is dialogical in the sense that it is not just a 
process of “advancing standpoints, but just as much criticising standpoints”. 
Accordingly, the dialectifi cation of argumentation analysis covers a set of 
rules for the dialectical conduct of critical discussion. 
 Nielsen (2005:185) notes that his approach to argumentative dialogue 
“can be approximately characterised ‘a pragma-dialectical approach’”, 
stressing that “Argumentation is a pragmatic phenomenon and should be 
studied as such. Argumentation should be evaluated in terms of its critical 
adequacy as a dialectical process, according to critical rationalist principles”. 
However, the pragma-dialectical approach is normative while the purpose of 
Nielsen’s approach is descriptive, aiming to ”show that language users do in 
fact occasionally reconstruct unexpressed premises in rational (co-operative/
reasonable) ways” (Nielsen 2005:188). 
3.1. A model of argumentative dialogue
Argumentative dialogue involves a protagonist who expresses and defends a 
point of view, and an antagonist who challenges and criticises the protagonist’s 
argument (Nielsen 2005:204). Nielsen proposes a model that illustrates these 
two roles and the linguistic actions typically connected to them, including the 
speech acts’ linguistic expressions and functions: 
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Figure 1: Model of argumentative dialogue (Nielsen 2005:204)
Th e antagonistic argumentation involves the meta-linguistic utterance 
 reconstruction and the meta-argumentative criticism. Neither of these are 
“ committed to particular direct speech act types”, but “may be phrased as 
 assertions, questions, etc.” (Nielsen 2005:198). Th e purpose of  reconstructions 
is to clarify the protagonist’s argumentation by reproducing what the 
 protagonist has literally uttered or by “indicating what the protagonist meant 
by what he said, or what he is further committed to mean in the given  situation” 
( Nielsen 2005:36). Th e reconstruction forms the basis of the antagonist’s 
 criticism, which is the core of the counter argument and criticises or evaluates 
the protagonist’s  argument (Nielsen 2005:209). 
 Following Searle’s taxonomy reconstructions are ”a special type of 
 representative speech act. But whereas the typical representative speech act 
aims at bringing ’the words to fi t the world’, this type aims at bringing the 
words to fi t some other words” (Nielsen 2005:206). Furthermore,  Nielsen 
(2005:206) argues, the essential condition regarding the reconstruction, is 
more complex because “the speaker/antagonist is non-committed to the truth 
of the  propositional content conveyed by the meta-linguistic referents, while 
he is committed to the truth of the meta-linguistic verbs and operators”. Th at 
is, the antagonist is committed to the consistency between the  propositional 
 content, or the intended meaning, and his reconstruction of this.  Consequently, 
a  reconstructive speech act “can never in itself add up to critical argument” 
(Nielsen 2005:209). 
 Hence, Nielsen (2005:206) proposes the following felicity conditions for 
reconstructive speech acts, 5 stressing that ”it is crucial to operate with two dif-
ferent propositional contents, the propositional content of the  reconstructive 
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1. Content condition (or propositional act.) 6
Any proposition p describing any proposition p’.
(This is a deviation from the representative speech act whose propositional 
content is simply ‘Any proposition p’. But reconstruction is meta-linguistic, 
so in order to count as a reconstruction, the content of the utterance should 
be about some other utterance, either its literal expression (paraphrase) or its 
implicit meaning (implicatum)).
2. Preparatory condition
2.1 Proposition p’ has been uttered (directly or indirectly) at some time prior 
to the utterance of proposition p.
2.2 S has evidence for p. It is not obvious to S and H that H already knows p. 
2.3 Insofar as p’ has been uttered by H, H is prepared to have p’ reconstruct-
ed or interpreted.
(Ad 2.1: Clearly, reconstructing some speech act presupposes that the speech 
act in question has actually been uttered (i.e., said, implicated, or implied) 
at the time of the reconstruction. 2.2 does not deviate from Searle’s account, 
while 2.3 simply states that it is a preparatory condition that H (if H is the 
protagonist) accepts to engage in meta-linguistic discourse about p’ in the 
given context.)
3. Sincerity condition
S believes that p accurately describes p’.
(S believes that his utterance, p, gives a charitable reconstruction of the re-
constructed utterance, p’, but he does not have to believe p’.)
4. Essential condition
S takes on the obligation that p accurately describes p’. 
(In producing the reconstructive utterance, S is committed to the accuracy of 
the fi t between meta-linguistic reconstruction and the utterance it is a recon-
struction of, but S is not committed to p’ representing a state of affairs.)
Figure 2: Felicity conditions for reconstructions (Nielsen 2005:207)
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As to the criticising speech act, Nielsen (2005:208-209) characterises this 
as ”a meta-linguistic description of the correspondence between some 
 linguistic phenomenon and the facts, or the coherence between two or more 
 linguistic phenomena”. Th at is, criticism as factual refutation referring to “the 
truth  value of some particular utterance”, or as formal refutation  referring 
to “the  consistency between two or more utterances”. When performing the 
 criticism, the speaker is only committed to his evaluation of the  reconstructed 
 propositional content. On that basis, Nielsen (2005:208) proposes the  following 
felicity conditions for criticising speech acts, represented by q. Th e utterance 
that is criticised or evaluated is represented by p. 
1. Content condition (or ‘propositional act’)
Any proposition q evaluating any proposition p’.
(The content of the utterance should be about some other utterance(s), and 
it should specify S’s evaluation of that other utterance, or S’s evaluation of 
the relationship between those other utterances.)
2. Preparatory condition
S has evidence for q. It is not obvious to S and H that H already knows q.
(Again this condition is identical to the condition for the prototypical ‘as-
sertion’, perhaps with the addition that insofar as p’ is ascribed to H, H 
should be prepared to accept having his utterances evaluated by S in the 
given context.)
3. Sincerity condition
S believes that q accurately evaluates p’.
(The speaker believes that his evaluation refers to the truth value of some 
utterance (factual refutation) or to the consistency between some utterances 
(formal refutation)), and that his evaluation is true.
4. Essential condition
S takes on the obligation that q accurately evaluates p’.
(S is committed to his utterance referring to the truth value of some utter-
ance or the consistency between some utterances.)
Figure 3: Felicity conditions for criticism (Nielsen 2005:208)
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As appears from the felicity conditions for reconstructions, Nielsen 
distinguishes between reconstructive speech acts in the form of paraphrases 
or implicata. A paraphrase is “an account of some proposition that has been 
literally said”, and “implicatum is understood as an account of some proposition 
which has been implicated by what has been literally said, and/or is derived as 
a necessary condition for the literally said to be coherent” (Nielsen 2005:206). 
 Nielsen (2005:175) distinguishes between implicata that are intended and 
non-intended by the speaker. Th e latter refers to a situation where the meaning 
intended by the speaker, and the meaning reconstructed by the hearer, are not 
identical. Nielsen suggests that “meaning is always negotiated in conversation”, 
and that non-intended meaning, like intended meaning, is implicatural. 
Th us, he elaborates on Grice’s account of conversational implicature saying 
that “In accounts like Grice’s it appears that meaning is transmitted from 
speaker to hearer“ (Nielsen 2005:175). As opposed to this, Nielsen (2005:175) 
stresses that “it is the hearer, not the speaker, that actually does the inferential 
work” and derives the implicatum. Hence, Nielsen characterizes “the act of 
implicature” as a reciprocal action involving a double agency, illustrated by the 
fi gure below:
A proposition for the graphical representation of the agency of implicature: 
Agency SPEAKER   HEARER 
of   
Act The Implicans      The Implicature  The Implicatum 
Figure 4: Th e agency of implicature (Nielsen 2005:176)
Nielsen (2005:176) argues that “an implicatum that was not intended by the 
speaker is also a result of the act of implicature, seeing that it was arrived at 
by the same kind of inferential procedure as traditional implicatures”. Hence, 
drawing on Ennis (1982, Nielsen 2005:178), Nielsen distinguishes between 
derived implicata as intended meaning (used assumptions), that is, “assumptions 
that have actually been intended by the speaker”, and commitments (needed 
assumptions) that are “thought to be necessary by a ‘rational judge’, i.e. some 
external norm for rationality”. On a theoretical level, the two kinds of implicata 
are diff erent, but in dialogue they are “performed in practically identical ways”, 
and “the practical analysis of argumentative dialogue will generally not be able 
to draw a distinct line between the two types of derived implicata” (Nielsen 
2005:179-180). 
4. Th e training interview as argumentative dialogue
Th e model of argumentative dialogue outlined above captures central features 
of more kinds of confl icting dialogue than argumentation per se. Indeed, the 
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training interview may be conceptualised through this lens. According to 
Nielsen (2005:136) “the fact that communication involves co-operation does 
not contradict the fact that argumentative dialogue is very oft en a kind of 
confl ict: there has to be a divergence of opinion, otherwise there cannot be 
argumentation in any ordinary sense of the word”. Th is point of view goes for 
training interviews as well. 
 In a police interview one might expect that the suspect ”may try to avoid 
committing himself to any defi nite statement of fact” (Levinson 1992:77). Th e 
interview in this study is not authentic, though, but during the training course, 
some of the participants are instructed to play the role of a suspect who is 
unwilling to share details with the interviewer and to lie about certain parts 
of the mock event. However, such individual and psychological dispositions, 
or lack of social cooperativeness, are not to be confused with Gricean, 
communicative cooperation and intentions (Archer 2005:58). Th us, when the 
mock suspect is lying or avoids shedding light on relevant parts of the event 
under investigation, he will most likely make his contributions as informative as 
required in the particular situation, but no more than that – that is, informative 
enough to count as communication and convey a communicative intention of 
truthfulness. As for the training activity, the participants also engage in a kind 
of argumentative dialogue when they reconstruct and evaluate the certainty 
of a co-participant’s utterances in relation to remembering and following the 
instructions, they have been given.
 Applying the model of argumentative dialogue to the training interview, I 
employ the interactional roles, protagonist and antagonist, though referring to 
them as interviewee and interviewer respectively. As mentioned in section 3, 
arguments are identifi ed as social in the pragma-dialectical approach, meaning 
that the participants in the argumentative interaction switch interactional roles 
in the dialogical process. In this respect, the training interview diff ers from the 
model of argumentative dialogue, at least with regard to the interview activity. 
In this kind of institutional interaction, “there is a signifi cant and built-in 
asymmetry of power and knowledge in the institutional participant roles 
(…) which cast the institutional member (…) as the questioner and the non-
institutional member (witness, defendant, suspect, etc.) as the respondent” 
(Harris 2011:282). 
 Hence, switching roles is not part of the interview activity, and consequently 
the interviewer, roughly speaking, has the interactional role of the antagonist 
who reconstructs and criticises the statements given by the interviewee who 
plays the role of a suspect, i.e. the protagonist in Nielsen’s model. Th ese are 
the role identities associated with and constrained by the interview activity. In 
terms of interactional roles, obviously, the training activity constitutes a less 
constraining frame for the participants to act within. 
Winnie Collin
Scandinavian Studies in Language, 11(1), 2020 (170-195)
180
4.1. Reconstructions as questions
In Nielsen’s model, the meta-communicative reconstructive speech act serves as 
a clarifi cation or warning on which the meta-argumentative criticism is based. 
In the excerpts presented in this paper, though, some of the reconstructions 
serve both a clarifying and a criticising or evaluating purpose. For that reason, 
I only employ the notion of reconstruction in my analysis, thus defi ning it as a 
speech act type that can fulfi l both the clarifying function and the criticising 
function. 
 According to Nielsen, both reconstructing and criticising utterances can 
be phrased as assertions, questions, etc. Based on interactional and semantic 
interpretations, I consider the reconstructions displayed in this paper to be 
functional questions in the sense that they are utterances that “eff ectively seek[s] 
to elicit information, confi rmation or agreement” (Heinemann 2010:2703, 
see also Stivers and Enfi eld 2010). Following Mortensen’s (2020, this issue) 
categorisation, the reconstructions resemble declarative questions, as they “do 
not have morphosyntactic features that clearly make them questions”, and echo 
questions, as they repeat (part of) the interviewee’s utterance and elicit a reply 
from the interviewee as well (Mortensen 2020, this issue, see also Noh 1998). 
Th e reconstructions share certain characteristics with declarative questions, 
seeing that declarative questions rarely function as ‘pure’ questions (Teleman, 
Hellberg and Andersson 1999, Mortensen 2018). Declarative questions, as 
well as reconstructions, are meta communicative and require an utterance 
prior to the declarative question (Mortensen 2018:118-119), and, equal to the 
essential condition of reconstructions, the speaker who utters a declarative 
question, is not committed to the truth of the propositional content, but to the 
meta linguistic operators (Mortensen 2018:124). 
 As the following analysis will illustrate, Nielsen’s model of argumentative 
dialogue makes it possible to capture how, on the one hand, the reconstructions 
function as questions seeking to elicit information and, on the other hand 
evaluate and test the interviewee’s statement and trustworthiness.
5. Method and data
Th e excerpts examined in this paper are a selection of examples from a study 
of the functions of reconstructions in mock police interviews. Th e  original 
 dataset consists of audio recordings of 39 mock police interviews and  originates 
from an experimental study in the fi eld of applied criminology and police 
management, conducted during an interview training-course for  experienced 
detectives (Hviid 2017). Th e mock interviews are set up as role-plays based 
on the same mock case. Th e participants attending the training course take 
turns playing the roles of the interviewer, suspect and a willing witness. Prior 
to playing the role of a suspect or a willing witness, the participants have read 
an instruction about their character, what they experienced during the event 
under investigation, and how much they are willing to tell the police (Hviid 
2017:33). During the mock interview, the participants are allowed to consult 
the written instruction.
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5.1. Th e mock case
Th e mock event under investigation is a case of violence that involves four 
young men7. One of them, Sedat, is a suspect and the interviewee in the 
 excerpts in this paper. Sedat is a gang member, and by the time of the event he 
was hanging out with a boy from the neighbourhood, Søren. Two young men, 
Louai and Kim, show up. Th ey are both members of a rival gang, and soon 
Sedat and Louai start to argue and push each other. Someone has brought a 
knife, and during the scuffl  e, Søren is hit and seriously injured. Kim and Louai 
run away, while Sedat and a witness take care of Søren. 
 In the mock case, two issues in particular are at stake. Firstly, who brought 
the knife, who stabbed Søren, and where is the knife now? Secondly, did 
the four young men meet by coincidence, or did Louai and Sedat set up the 
 meeting to discuss an ongoing confl ict? 
5.2. Method
An initial review of the data material showed that the interviewers 
 characteristically repeat and paraphrase the interviewees’ statements in 
 various ways that seem to fulfi l diff erent functions in the particular contexts. 
 Four interviews with mock suspects were chosen for further analysis, 
and based on transcriptions of these, using standard orthography, without 
 indicating intonation, pause lengths etc., the interviews were hand-coded 
 inductively as part of a preliminary analysis. 
Based on the preliminary analysis of the four interviews, three  predominant 
functions that the reconstructions seem to fulfi l were identifi ed; request 
for confi rmation, request for elaboration and evaluation. While requests 
for  confi rmations and elaboration, roughly speaking, clarify in terms of 
 comprehension, equalling Nielsen’s reconstructive speech act, the  evaluating 
reconstructions question truth value and trustworthiness, more or less 
 equalling Nielsen’s criticising speech act. Furthermore, the evaluating  function 
diff ers from requests for confi rmation and elaboration because the  interviewee 
either changes his or her explanation or sticks to the explanation that the 
 interviewer evaluates or questions, thus making the dispute clear despite the 
interviewer’s disbelief in his or her trustworthiness.
 Th e three functions formed the basis of a quantitative overview of the 
 reconstructions’ occurrences and functions in the four interviews and, 
 furthermore, a qualitative analysis of two of the four interviews8. Th e two 
 interviews illustrate how the reconstructions fulfi l diff erent purposes, 
 especially when the interaction is confl ictual, and how the reconstructions 
operate across the activities embedded in the training interview. Th e purpose 
of this paper is to illustrate sequences of interaction where the  reconstructions 
function across the activities and in the intersection of social cooperation 
and non-cooperation, when the interviewer on the one hand questions the 
 suspect’s trustworthiness, and on the other hand helps his co-participant 
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and supports the training activity. For this reason, the qualitative analysis is 
 focused on reconstructions with a predominantly evaluating function. 
6. Analysis
Th e excerpts9 in the analysis below are from an interview with the mock 
 suspect Sedat. Sedat has a criminal background, and the police knows him 
very well. He is member of a criminal gang and is not in any way interested 
in talking to the police, and whenever possible he sidesteps issues that hold a 
potential confl ict. 
 In this interview, a female interviewee plays Sedat’s character. Th erefore, 
I refer to the interviewee as she and her, even though Sedat is male. It is very 
diffi  cult for the interviewee to remember her instructions, which shows in 
various ways. Several times, she pauses during her explanation and tries to 
remember what to say, sometimes laughing and sometimes rereading her 
 instruction before going on with the interview. At one point during the 
 interview, the participants explicitly stop the interview activity and step out 
of the roles as suspect and detective. Th e interviewee is rather confused and 
tells the interviewer and the attending observer that it is very hard for her to 
remember the instructions and to distinguish the characters from the mock 
case, therefore struggling to remember which character she is actually playing, 
and what she is supposed to answer. 
 In the analysis, I will illustrate how the interviewer questions and raises 
doubt about the certainty of the interviewee’s statements by  reconstructing the 
epistemic expressions in the interviewee’s propositions. Prior to the  interaction 
in excerpt 1, the interviewee has explained that she and another suspect were 
arguing. Suddenly Søren, the victim, was screaming and bleeding, and the 
 interviewee says that “something must have hit him”. Th e interviewee does not 
know what this “something” was, but says that it might have been a knife. In 
addition, she claims that she does not know who brought the knife, and now 
the interviewer tries to shed light on this issue. 
Excerpt 110
1  IN:    in that case where did the knife come from
2  IE:  →  well it is jo it is jo probably that guy Louaia who who had it
3  IN:  →  probably that guy Louaia who had it
4  IE:     yes
5  IN:  →  yes why are you saying that it is probably him who had it can  
        you explain a 
6    →  bit about that
7  IE:  →  well so it is jo, because when when he (p) when he started   
      and and
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8      scold me there right er 
9  IN:    yes
10  IE:  →  about, er, my family then then, er, then I jo got really angry jo  
      and like 
11      that and then I also started jo pushing him a little
12  IN:    okay 
13  IE:    at at Louaia that so so so therefore so, er, then then all of a   
      sudden I was afraid 
14    →  because then I could all of a sudden see one that that that   
      Louaia had a knife 
15  IN:  →  you are saying that you see a knife then
16  IE:    yes
17  IN:    yes
18  IE:  →  I actually see a knife
19  IN:  →  try to tell a little more about that if you try to
20  IE:    yes
21  IN:    recall, er, when you see the knife for the fi rst time.
In line 2 in the excerpt above, the interviewee employs the epistemic adverb 
nok ‘probably’, thus indicating that she is guessing or that her statement is 
based on inference rather than recollection or knowledge about what she saw 
during the event (Jacobsen 1992:15). By employing probably the  interviewee 
“opens the dialogical space” (Mortensen and Mortensen 2017:415, see also 
White 2003, Martin and White 2005), and by indicating weak epistemic 
 support for the statement, the interviewee gives herself the opportunity to 
 revise her statement if necessary (Mortensen 2012:67). 
 Th e interviewer reconstructs the proposition, emphasising probably and 
thereby addressing the interviewee’s uncertainty and questioning the truth 
 value of a statement based on guesses and inferred conclusions.  Considering 
the speech act as a declarative question, the interviewer questions the 
 evidential basis for the statement. Th is seems to recur in the wh-question 
 following (line 5), where the interviewer asks why the interviewee says that 
it is probably Louaia, thus requesting the interviewee to explain the reason 
(Heinemann 2010:2713) for the uncertainty rather than elaborating on the 
 propositional content.  However, the interviewer employs lidt ‘a little’ in 
his question,  thereby downplaying the utterance and making it possible for 
the interviewee to revise her explanation – which she does (line 7) aft er she 
has consulted the written instruction for the mock case and her role as the 
 suspect. Based on this and the following revised statement, it seems plausible 
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that the weak epistemic support, marked by probably (line 2), derives from the 
 participant’s trouble remembering the instructions for the mock case and her 
role as the suspect Sedat in particular. Th us, the training activity and the mock 
interview activity intertwine, and from the perspective of the interviewee, the 
opening of the dialogical space might be a way of showing her uncertainty 
about the  instructions, thereby leaving herself with the opportunity to revise 
her statement if it is questioned or challenged by the interviewer. 
 In line 7-15, the interviewee changes her explanation about the knife, now 
stating that Louai did have a knife. Four times in this sequence (line 7, 10, 
11), she employs the Danish dialogical particle jo ‘as you know’.  Th ereby, the 
interviewee indicates mutual agreement about her statement, as jo holds the 
 polyphonic instruction that the speaker has a point of view that she  expects the 
interviewer to agree upon (Hansen and Heltoft  2019:1050). Th e  interviewee 
ends her revised explanation by saying that she faktisk ‘actually’ sees a knife. 
By employing actually she indicates and recognises that an opposing point 
of view is possible (in this case her own inferred conclusion in line 2), but 
that she no longer subscribes to that (Mortensen 2012:82). Furthermore, the 
verb see is in the present tense. Th is is an example of dramatic present tense 
(Searle 2001:106) and might indicate that the utterance refers to a here and 
now in the interaction of both the training activity and the interview  activity. 
In  combination with the relatively strong epistemic support from  actually, 
the  inference derived in relation to the training activity could be that the 
 participant is now more certain about the instruction and her role as a mock 
suspect. As a contribution to the interaction in the interview activity, the use 
of the present tense might be a way of making her explanation more trust-
worthy. 
 In summary, excerpt 1 shows two examples of how the interviewer 
 reconstructs and emphasises the particular part of the interviewee’s  utterance 
that signals certainty – or the lack of it. In both cases, the reconstruction 
 evaluates the epistemic stance taking, thus, by itself forming an indirect 
 question about trustworthiness and truth value. Th e interviewer  expresses 
this question more explicitly in the requests for elaboration that follow. 
 Referring to the model for argumentative dialogue, another possible  analysis 
could be that the reconstruction in line 3, holding the epistemic stance  marker 
 probably, is a clarifying warning about the following criticism or evaluation. 
 Nevertheless, I fi nd it reasonable to say that the reconstruction in itself holds 
both a  reconstructive and a criticising and evaluating aspect, and that the 
 interviewer makes this explicit in the following wh-question because the 
 interviewee does not respond to the implicit questioning at fi rst. 
 Whether the interviewee’s utterances in excerpt 1 express a combination of 
the participant’s trouble remembering and the mock suspect’s  unwillingness 
to talk to the police is not possible to tell for certain. It is possible to  derive 
 meaning in relation to the inferential frame of both the training  activity 
and the interview activity, while not knowing which implicature is  actually 
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 intended by the interviewee. Th e interviewer seems to respond to the 
 utterances as  contributions to the interview activity, but his reconstructions of 
the  ambiguous utterances fi t the inferential frames of both the training  activity 
and the interview activity, thus questioning his co-participant’s memory and 
the mock suspect’s unwillingness respectively. 
 Later in the interview, an exchange similar to the one in excerpt 1 takes 
places. Prior to the exchange in excerpt 2 below, the interviewee has explained 
that during the quarrel Louai tries to stab the interviewee, and that Kim, the 
interviewee’s friend, tries to intervene. Th e interviewer asks the interviewee to 
elaborate on what was going on. 
Excerpt 2
1 IE:  yes (sighs), er, (p) I do not quite know how he grabs it I just  
   think he is trying
2   to help me like in this situation because he knows that it can  
   end up badly (.), 
3  → er, (p) and then there’s this boy that that the Danish boy I   
   think he had a knife 
4  → too actually (p)
5 IN: → think
6 IE:  well yes [it]
7 IN:   [yes]
8 IE: → it he had a knife too
9 IN: → try to explain a bit about that
In the excerpt above, the interviewee says that she tror ‘thinks’ that the Danish 
boy had a knife too (line 3). By using the epistemic verb think, the interviewee 
marks her utterance as a subjective speech act with relatively weak evidential 
support (Mortensen 2012:82). However, she ends her statement with faktisk 
‘actually’ in the fi nal position, which marks a stronger evidential support to the 
statement. By repeating think (line 5), the interviewer evaluates the epistemic 
basis for the statement. Th us, in the context this reconstruction functions as 
an elliptical declarative (Heinemann 2010:2705) that raises doubts about the 
subjective and epistemic part of the interviewee’s statement. Th e interviewee 
responds rather vaguely, though maintaining that the Danish boy had a knife 
(line 9). In her response she uses the past tense of the verb had. Compared 
to her use of the present tense in excerpt 1 (line 14), this could indicate that 
the utterance in this case functions as a contribution to the interaction in the 
interview activity, and that the intended inference is that the mock suspect is 
now standing by her explanation.  
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 In excerpt 1 and 2, I have shown how the interviewer reconstructs those 
parts of the interviewee’s utterances that mark epistemic stance taking, thus 
questioning the truth value or certainty of the interviewee’s proposition, 
 depending on which inferential frame the meaning is derived from. In  excerpt 
1, this brings the interviewee to revise her explanation, possibly because the 
expression of weak epistemic support actually derives from the  participant’s 
trouble remembering her instruction, and the epistemic stance marker 
 functions across the training activity and the interview activity. In excerpt 2, 
on the other hand, the interviewee maintains her explanation, presumably in 
this case staying in her role as a suspect. 
 Like in excerpt 1, the interviewee employs probably in a later  utterance, 
shown in excerpt 3 below. Similar to excerpt 1 and 2, the interviewer 
 reconstructs the interviewee’s utterance, but in this case he does not include 
the epistemic stance marker in the reconstruction. Th is could indicate a 
 diff erent function of the reconstruction in this particular exchange.
 To understand what is going on in excerpt 3, a brief summary of the 
 interaction at the beginning of the interview might be helpful. In the 
 preliminary free account, the interviewee explains that she was going to meet 
a friend at the day of the event under investigation. She says that it was “just 
a friend” and that she does not remember who he was – but it was not Louai. 
A little later, the  interviewee says that she does not feel like  telling the friend’s 
name, again saying that it was “just somebody”.  Obviously, this seems like the 
interviewee playing her role as the unwilling suspect  Sedat  trying to cover up 
the truth. However, in the light of the interviewee’s trouble  remembering her 
 instructions and the details of the mock case, an  alternative  interpretation could 
be that she is  trying to make this  uncertainty part of the role as an  unwilling 
suspect. As  already mentioned, the interviewee has  trouble  remembering the 
characters and the sequence of events in the mock case as it is described in 
the  instructions. Th is, in particular, becomes clear and is said aloud by the 
 interviewee right before the exchange in  excerpt 3. Th e  interviewee  explicitly 
steps out of her role as a suspect and tells her co- participants that it is hard 
for her to understand and remember the  instructions. Furthermore, she is 
confused about the character she is supposed to play in the ongoing  interview, 
because she keeps mixing up the instructions and characters from the 
 various training interviews she is supposed to take part in during the training 
course. Th is talk also reveals that she has made a wrong statement during the 
 ongoing  interview, and her co-participants, the interviewer and the  observer, 
agree that she seems quite confused. Aft er this short exchange between 
the  co- participants, the interviewer, without further notice, returns to the 
 training interview. By reference to a printout from the interviewee’s  mobile 
phone, he brings up the still  unresolved issue of whether the interviewee was 
going to meet Louai or another friend, and whether the meeting between the 
 interviewee and Louai was planned or not. 
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Excerpt 3
1 IN:   but when I look at this report (.) secured phone (.) that is jo   
   your phone 
2 IE:  yes
3 IN:  here I can see that there is this phone conversation on May 11  
   between you
4   and Louai (p) er both in the afternoon and in the evening (p)  
   do you remember 
5   what you talked about on the phone that day (p) I do realise  
   that it is one day
6   ago but er it was yesterday
7 IE: → well it is jo probably because it was him then we were going  
   to meet jo
8 IN: → it was (.) Louai you were going to meet
9 IE:  yes
10 IN:  yes (p) okay so you arranged that with Louai
11 IE:   well yes
12 IN:  did you plan where you were going to meet
13 IE:  well (p) we think supposedly we talked about meeting by the  
   courtyard
In the excerpt above, the interviewee employs the epistemic stance marker 
nok ‘probably’ in her utterance (line 7). On the one hand, probably might refer 
to the causal relation between the interviewee’s and Louai’s phone call and the 
fact that they met at day of the event under investigation, that is, the reason 
for her conversation with Louai is that she did plan to meet him the next day. 
On the other hand, probably might refer to the fact that it was Louai, and not 
another friend, the interviewee was going to meet. Each interpretation might 
be relevant, as both issues have been sources of confl ict and confusion during 
various stages of the interview. 
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 Th e interviewee also employs jo ‘as you know’ twice in her utterance; 
in  relation to probably and in the fi nal position of her proposition.  Seeing 
that  probably does not per se specify the epistemic strength or the degree of 
 probability (Hansen and Heltoft  2019:1058), but covers a spectrum “from 
the wildest guess to the most deliberate and watertight inference” ( Jacobsen 
1992:15), a possible interpretation is that the interviewer responds to the 
 interviewee’s use of probably as a statement of fact rather than  conjecture. 
Th is due to the strong epistemic support from jo. Th us, it seems that 
the  interviewer does not use the reconstruction to raise doubt about the 
 interviewee’s  intentions or certainty, but to conclude and seek affi  rmation that 
the interviewee had actually planned to meet Louai on the day of the event. In 
this case, the  reconstruction seems to count primarily as a contribution to the 
mock interview and the interviewee’s utterance as a speech act with relatively 
strong epistemic support. 
 An alternative interpretation is that the interviewee’s utterance (line 
7) is directed primarily at the training activity, and, within that inferential 
frame, functions as a question seeking affi  rmation. As mentioned, jo might 
indicate strong epistemic support for the interviewee’s statement. Right 
 before the  exchange in excerpt 3, however, the interviewee has expressed 
anything but strong support for her explanation when she was talking with 
her co- participants about her confusion. Hence, in this instance, rather 
than  indicating consensus by using jo twice, it seems that the interviewee is 
 violating the  maxim of quantity, thereby actually seeking confi rmation of the 
content of her proposition – and an affi  rmation from her co-participant that 
she  remembers her instruction correctly. In this perspective, jo in the fi nal 
position seems to function as an adverbial tag, thus turning the  declarative 
into a question (Heinemann 2010: 2707). Jo is not commonly used as a tag, 
but due to its polyphonic instruction of consensus, and because particles like 
jo acquire dialogical meaning depending on their particular sentence  position 
(Mortensen and Mortensen 2017:211, see also Jensen 2000,  Christensen 2007), 
an interpretation of jo equalling a positive adverbial tag seems  plausible. 
 Th e interpretation of the interviewee’s utterance as a question is further-
more based on the cleft  sentence it was him then we were going to meet jo 
(line 7). By employing this, the interviewee is both presupposing that she was 
going to meet somebody, and at the same time points out that, among other 
possible persons, this someone was Louai. Th is might refl ect the interviewee’s 
recurring confusion between the characters in the mock event, and the use of 
probably might, within the inferential frame of the training activity, indicate 
that this is what she believes to be the right interpretation of the instruction 
and the events in the mock case.
 In other sequences during the interview, when the interviewee shows signs 
of a bad memory and confusion regarding her character, the  interviewer seems 
to stay in his role as a detective and responds to the interviewee’s  utterances 
as if they count as contributions to the activity of the mock  interview. Th is is 
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also the case in excerpt 3, but the omission of the epistemic stance marker, 
probably, makes the reconstruction in this excerpt diff erent from the others. 
Th is could indicate that the reconstruction is a contribution to the  interaction 
between the participants in the training activity, and that the interviewer is 
 responding to the interviewee’s utterance as a question,  confi rming that she, 
his co-participant, remembers her instruction and role as a suspect  correctly. 
Th e interviewer does not explicitly step out of his role as a detective, though, 
but by this little change in the reconstruction, he seems to point out the 
 relevant inferential frame and show that the training interview is back on 
track. 
 Another argument for interpreting the reconstruction as  primarily 
a  contribution to the training activity is the questioning function of the 
 interviewee’s utterance prior to the reconstruction. An exchange like that, 
where the suspect asks questions about the event under investigation, does 
not fi t the conventional form of an investigative police interview,  including the 
casting of the detective as the questioner. Hence, in the light of the  constraints 
on allowable contributions in the two diff erent activity types and the  preceding 
exchange between the co-participants, it seems plausible that the inference is 
to be derived primarily from the inferential frame of the  training activity. 
7. Summarising the interview – and the analysis
When the interview reaches the closing stage, the interviewer summarises 
what the interviewee has told about the mock event under investigation, and 
he lets the interviewee know that he does not believe her. For instance he says 
that part of the interviewees’ explanation ”sounds a little odd” and places the 
responsibility for this oddness and the lack of information on the  interviewee 
by saying that he will write in his report that the interviewee refuses to make 
suffi  cient statements about the confl ictual issues. Th us, he indicates that he 
believes that the unclarifi ed parts of the event are the result of the  interviewee’s 
unwillingness to tell rather than a bad memory. 
 As shown in excerpt 1 and 2, the interviewer raises doubts about the 
 uncertainty and trustworthiness of the interviewee during the  questioning 
 stages of the interview. In these examples, however, he mitigates the 
 confrontation in the follow up questions, saying try to tell a little more 
about that (excerpt 1, line 9) and yes why are you saying that it is  probably 
him who had it can you explain a bit about that (excerpt 1, line 5-6). In the 
closing  summary, the interviewer does not mitigate his utterances like this, 
and it seems that during the interview he has compensated for the  potential 
face threats that his questioning poses to the interviewee. Th is may be due 
to the  interviewer’s  interpretation of the weak epistemic support to the 
 propositions as an  indication of the co- participant’s uncertainty rather than 
the mock  suspect’s unwillingness. Th at is, considering the propositions as, 
 maybe  intended, implicata within the inferential frame of the training 
 activity.  Consequently, his reconstructions have fulfi lled a double function 
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and  operated across the training activity and the interview activity by  raising 
doubts about the  trustworthiness of the mock suspect while also responding 
to the derived  implicatum and  supporting the co-participant. In the context 
of the training activity, the  reconstructions of the interviewee’s utterances are 
not  questioning the truth value or the trustworthiness of the  interviewee, 
but  evaluate the  consistency between the instruction and the  interviewee’s 
 statement. Whether or not such double function can explain why the 
 interviewer mitigates his utterances and compensates for the face threat of 
a co-participant, is not obvious. Nevertheless, the interviewee shows more 
certainty and unwillingness to cooperate when she is clearly enacting the role 
identity of the suspect at the end of the interview. Hence, the interviewer does 
not have to protect a co-participant’s face, and in that situation, he seems less 
concerned with mitigating his utterances when he questions the interviewee’s 
intentions. 
8. Conclusions
Th e interview analysed in this paper is a mock police interview conducted as 
part of a training course for skilled police offi  cers. In the training  interview, 
the participants navigate two distinctly diff erent activity types, developing 
within diff erent inferential frames; the training activity and the interview 
 activity.
 Th e interview activity simulates an asymmetric relation between the 
 participants who are instructed to act as interlocutors of an interaction that 
does not take its natural point of departure in mutual expectations of social 
cooperativeness. In the training activity, though, the participants are part of 
a symmetric relation, and they share the same goals for the  communication, 
among these to get the most out of the training interview and keep it on 
the right track. Th is activity invites to social cooperation. In the analysis, I 
have shown how contributions to the interaction function across these two 
 activities, even though the inferential frames and the conditions for these 
 activities are inherently diverse. 
 In the excerpts displayed in this paper, both the socially non-c ooperative 
and cooperative aspects show, because one of the participants struggles 
with remembering her instruction. When her utterances seem to express 
this  struggle and uncertainty as a participant in the training activity, the 
 interviewer makes his contributions to the interaction interpretable in  relation 
to both the training activity and the interview activity. Th e analysis illustrates 
how the  interviewer by reconstructive speech acts manages to  evaluate the 
 interviewee’s utterances across the activities. With the reconstructions, the 
 interviewer  raises doubt about the trustworthiness of the mock suspect, hence 
 contributing to the role-played interaction, and simultaneously addresses the 
uncertainty of the co-participant, thereby supporting the participant and 
keeping the training activity on the right track.
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 By applying Nielsen’s model of argumentative dialogue to the training 
 interview, I have illustrated how the model has the potential to capture central 
features of confl icting dialogue within diff erent activity types. In particular, 
the speech act types reconstruction and criticism are essential in the  training 
interview. In this context, the reconstructions function as questions that, 
within the inferential frame of this particular activity type, oft en serve both a 
clarifying and a criticising function. 
 Th e analysis also shows how the participants negotiate  comprehension 
and possible inferences. Whether the derived implicatum is intended by the 
 interviewee, is not possible to tell from the excerpts, as her propositions in most 
cases can count as statements from both the mock suspect and the  participant 
in the training course. Th e interviewer responds to this double possibility of 
inference, and apparently forms his reconstruction as c ontributions to the 
 interview activity, while also making an interpretation within the inferential 
frame of the training activity possible. 
 Th ese contributions, holding diverse possible implicata, show how 
the  participants take part in the reciprocal act of implicature, and how the 
activity- crossing implicatures both contribute to the mock interview and 
 simultaneously support the participants and guide the training interview.   
Appendix 1, excerpt 1 (Danish)
1  IN:    hvor skulle den kniv i så fald være kommet fra
2  IE:  →  (p) jamen altså det jo (p) det er jo nok ham der Louaia der der  
        havde den (p)
3  IN:  →  nok ham der Louaia der havde den
4  IE:     ja
5  IN:  →  ja (p) hvorfor siger du det nok er ham der havde den (.) kan  
        du forklare lidt om 
6        det
7  IE:  →  ej men altså det er jo fordi da da han (p) da han begyndte og  
      og skælde mig ud 
8      der ikke øh 
9  IN:    ja
10  IE:  →  om øh min familie så så øh så blev jeg jo rigtig sur jo og   
      sådan noget og så 
11      begyndte jeg jo også og skubbe lidt til ham (.)
12  IN:    okay
13  IE:    til til Louaia der så så så derfor så øh så så lige pludselig så   
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      blev jeg bange 
14      fordi så kunne jeg lige pludselig se en at: at at Louaia havde  
      en kniv på sig 
15  IN:  →  du siger du ser en kniv så
16  IE:    ja 
17  IN:    ja
18  IE:  →  jeg ser [faktisk en kniv]
19  IN:  →             [prøv at fortælle] lidt mere om det hvis du prøver og 
20  IE:    ja
21  IN:    genopfrisk øh hvornår ser du den kniv første gang
Appendix 2, excerpt 2 (Danish)
1 IE:  Ja (sukker lidt) øhm (p) jeg ved ikke helt hvordan han tager  
   den jeg tror bare
2   han prøver på og hjælpe mig ligesom i den her situation fordi  
   han godt ved at 
3   det kan gå galt (.) øhm (p) og så er der den her dreng der den  
   der danske dreng 
4  → jeg tror også han havde en kniv faktisk (p)
5 IN: → tror
6 IE:  jaer (.) [det]
7 IN:             [ja]
8 IE:  det han havde også en kniv
9 IN: → prøv at forklare lidt om det
Appendix 3, excerpt 3 (Danish)
1 IN:   men når jeg kigger på den her rapport sikret telefon (.) som jo  
   er din telefon 
2 IE:  ja
3 IN:  der kan jeg se der er den her telefonsamtale 11. maj mellem  
   dig og Louai (p) 
4   øhm det er både om eftermiddagen og om aftenen (p) kan du  
   huske hvad du 
5   snakkede med ham om i telefonen den dag (p) jeg ved godt   
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   det er en dag siden 
6   men øh det var i [går]
7 IE: → [jamen] det er jo nok fordi det så var ham vi skulle mødes   
   med jo
8 IN: → det var (.) Louai I skulle mødes med
9 IE:  ja
10 IN:  ja (p) okay så det aftalte du med Louai
11 IE:   jaer
12 IN:  aftalte I hvor I skulle mødes henne
13 IE:  jaer (p) vi tror vist nok vi snakkede om vi skulle mødes ved  
   gården
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 1 PEACE: Planning and preparation, Engage and explain, Account, Closure, And 
Evaluation of the interview and the interviewer’s performance (Clarke and Milne 
2001:1)  
 2 For describing and analysing this kind of communication, Linell and  Th unqvist 
suggest the dynamic concept of framing rather than frame (see Linell and 
 Th unqvist 2003). 
 3 I refer to the participants as interviewer and interviewee. Th e latter is the  participant 
who plays the role as a suspect, and the interviewer is the detective who is doing 
the interview.  
 4 Archer (2005:58) distinguishes between Gricean conversational cooperation and 
social cooperation.  
 5 Note that Nielsen uses ‘speaker’ and ‘hearer’ instead of the argumentative roles. 
Th e reason is that “while the speaker of a reconstructive or critical speech act is 
necessarily identical to the argumentative role of antagonist, it is not given that the 
hearer is necessarily identical to the protagonist role” (Nielsen 2005:206). 
 6 Th e comments about the felicity conditions for reconstructions and criticism are 
Nielsen’s own. 
 7 Th e description of the event under investigation is based on the instruction 
 material from the experimental study (Hviid 2019:99).  
 8 Due to lack of space the quantitative overview is not presented in this paper.  
194
 9 Th e excerpts are English translations, except for the Danish dialogical particle jo 
(‘as you know’) as it has no direct translation equivalent in English. Th e original 
Danish excerpts are to be found in appendices 1, 2, and 3. 
 10 IN: the interviewer. IE: the interviewee. 
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